Trident thoughts - 1 comment

Excuse the rhetoric, but one of the luxuries of inhabiting a country which has not had to fight for its very survival within the living memory of the under-60s who dominate the electorate (assuming that a strike from the Eastern Bloc would probably have been the result of "provocation", and that the Cold War just ended as if through the actions of some unseen, unknown force) is that threats to national security, which have motivated political leaders - the good, the bad, and the self-seeking - for just about all but the last 25 years of our history, can be wished-away. After all, nobody's seriously threatening us, are they? Wouldn't it be irrational for a rogue state to hold us to nuclear blackmail, and couldn't we just talk to them (see, TB, that's where you've been going wrong) and persuade them that whatever we did wrong, we won't do it again?

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This Trident discussion isn't made any simpler to nail down by the fact that a fair proportion are opposed to nuclear power altogether, and given that one can't have a military programme without a civilian one (either one at home, or a friendly one abroad), I think it's fair to put the anti-nuclear contingent entirely on the anti-Trident-renewal side. Why would one do that? Well, because the issue at hand is presumably that of the need to maintain a military system that has similar (or at least, sufficient, however that is determined) deterrence capability as the existing one. Opposing nuclear armament, or indeed any significant defence spending, suggests that one has opted out of contributing to that particular decision. It may not be the most important decision; it may even be one where we never see the benefits (I take it there won't be many of us left to see the decision shown to have been a mistake), but simply deciding that the situation cannot ever apply, and that the most extreme threat to a nation's security will arise, looks like an unnecessary hostage to fortune.

It's easy to believe - for recent generations - that wars just end, when the free peoples of one participant eventually persuade their Government to give peace a chance, but WWII demonstrated that the Japanese regime was willing to put its civilians and armed forces through extraordinary levels of punishment to keep the conventional war going and preserve the nationalistic myths that kept it in power. Michael Meacher - no, really - opines about nuclear weapons on his blog thusly: "None of our wars was ever won by them and none of our enemies was ever defeated by them." That Michael has an unconventional take on "our war" and "our enemies" doesn't surprise me, but turning a blind eye to the need for terrible decisions to be taken on a huge scale, and the vast numbers of extra casualties that would have resulted if the Japanese theatre of WWII hadn't been forcibly closed, entirely through the use of - and capacity to use - nuclear weapons, is really not very helpful. Is it so far-fetched to imagine that a similarly fanatical regime could hold sway in the future, prepared to grind up conventional forces by the million? It's not my intention to smear all opponents of Trident-renewal (or equivalent-replacement) as being as batty as Meacher, just to say that that kind of disinformation needs to be combated before we can sensibly proceed.

Yes, it's a position that can be abused, but if the Government doesn't provide for the security of the UK - given that UK cities would be attacked irrespective of the nationalities or politics of the individuals unlucky enough to reside in them at the time - then it's reneging on its primary duty to its citizens, whatever some faction of the citizenry would rather that money be spent on.

Of course when I say "that money", I mean the people's own money, money that governments are implicitly contracted to spend in a way that aligns with the public's wishes. Does it, however, follow that government spending is divisible in such a way that the sums of money - £20bn+ - being referred to as the cost of updating and improving Trident could really be shifted, lock stock and barrel, elsewhere?

Judging by the comments left at Compass's Trident-discussion page, many have alternatives in mind. I wouldn't say the ideas were vague, fantastical, and uncosted (one commenter - a Dr., no less - argues that "a multiplicity of other investments in genuine quality of life improvements for the global North & South" would be a better use of the money, and who am I to disagree?) The problem is that everyone has their own wish-list but doesn't recognise that - at the very least - any Trident revenue released would have to be spread thinly across all these competing interests. Yes, I'd like to "eradicate curable disease in the developing world and end extreme islamic terrorism", but they can best be (and are) being tackled in other ways; linking them to Trident is simply a red herring.

Secondly, each believes that that public money will be used in the most effective imaginable way - that a one-off contribution of a few £bn to the NHS budget will have an impact out of all proportion to the existing £96bn for 2006-07 alone.

Thirdly, few know what proportion of the, say, £20bn can be spent: only on Trident; or Trident-like things; on submarines; on nuclear technology and nuclear experts; on defence systems; on products used in, by, or for Trident; and so on. No, I certainly wouldn't be happy to hear that a large sum of public money has effectively been ring-fenced by being tied to a particular technology or product, thus reducing the taxpayer's ability to exert control, but that's how complex systems work in practice. A cynic would prepare the public for the news that, of the £20bn headline cost, only £10bn might be recoverable, and that it would disappear into the public purse, spread so thinly over the life of the project as to be never seen again.

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So who decides what defensive systems the UK deploys: het-up supporters of the current party in Government? Or how about the electorate as a whole? How can we run a referendum on a topic that - apart from some defence workers - doesn't impact on anyone individually; where the product we're paying for doesn't materialise for perhaps another 20 years; which we can neither see, touch, or use ourselves even when it's ready; whose security benefits will accrue to millions of people as yet unborn, and not to millions alive today who won't be in 20 years; a system which future generations might not be able to resurrect in time if we didn't set the ball rolling now?

There are obvious democratic reasons why we should consult the electorate, and economic mechanisms through which the public could theoretically express their view to governments in a way that could answer the above concerns - see here and here. To be honest, I'm too interested in how that could be done to want to dwell on the unlikelihood that these concerns could seriously be considered, through a referendum that culminated in a: "well, you've heard all the arguments on the news and in the 'papers, now, it's time for a Yes or a No". We've seen that it's very difficult for democracies to pursue wars (abroad, at least; presumably public opinion would look rather different in the event of a nuclear attack) in the full glare of publicity, with the understandable aversion of the public to casualties, the fact that the military is greatly constrained in what forces it can deploy, however right or wrong the goal might be. Nonetheless, whatever problems Labour Parties have had with nuclear issues in the past, allowing the Trident decision to be presented as a fait accompli, and/or a decision that only the Prime Minister (alone?) could take, is not really what we expect in a pluralist society - even if the decision is almost certainly the most sensible one.

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There's a lot of talk about whether Britain's deterrent is to be "independent". I'm not at all sure if I would want it to be independent, even if in the process I give up the ability to make quips about "America's coat-tails" and the chance to join forces with the little-England tendency. If we can't rely upon the United Nations, a body like NATO might be the organisation that has the consistency of purpose to take decisions on the use of the nuclear weapons by its member states, enhancing the credibility of retaliation with the danger of automaticity, enhancing collective security, and preventing individual members from pursuing their own ambitions. One of the charges against the Trident upgrade is that "it will never be used" and therefore is a waste of money. Is that thought based upon the likelihood of nuclear attack - probably - or the likelihood of our leaders declining to respond in kind if attacked? I don't really want to go deep into MAD territory, only to say that - though it's perhaps less relevant whether the decision is actually taken for real - the suspicion among our attackers that it might not not only guarantees that our deterrent is a complete and utter waste of money, but also fails to deter attacks, both on us and our allies. Like it or not, it has to be clear that our deterrent is up-to-date, ready for action, and - whether under British or NATO control - will be used. If we're not serious on these fronts, then the critics who talk about "white elephants" and "tickets to the top table" might not be as far wrong as they look - and sound.

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Leaving aside the issue of whether the post-WWII nuclear threat is greater than the pre-WWII threat of wars involving massive conventional forces, what can be done to minimise that nuclear threat? Time, before I forget, to introduce the excellent debate hosted at Prospect, which touches on the issue of what impact British disarmament might have. Anyway, I think there's another inconsistency in the approach of the unilateralists. If they're right in saying that Britain's deterrent represents its ticket to the "top table", and that Britain really is an American stooge, what influence could Britain logically have when it disables its deterrent and calls upon others to do so? I suggest the answer would be very little at all. Why shoot themselves in the foot? Isn't it just as likely that our smaller, or less powerful allies might feel the need to protect themselves with their own deterrents, or try to squeeze under the American nuclear umbrella? It's a thought. I'd prefer to reduce nuclear tensions through: collective security, addressing the threat of 'rogue' regime and the causes of rogue regimes, the inspection of all nuclear sites, and the prevention of the trafficking of nuclear materials.

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Well, that's it (yawn). Obviously I would say all that, and perhaps it was so predictable that people up and down the country are, as we speak, opening sealed envelopes entitled "B4L's Trident post" to reveal the above thoughts, and collecting fivers from the awe-struck throng. Nonetheless, it's my small contribution to the debate. Was it a little one-sided? Hmm, a little, perhaps, but I tried to address a range of opinion, and I think someone who only read one article on the subject (not a good idea, to be sure) wouldn't have made a bad choice. What sort of impact are you expecting? Well, judging by the length I doubt most will read it through, and it probably only shows up "below the fold" on tiny screens anyway. Maybe it'll affirm some people in their views, while others will follow a link or two and mull a few thoughts over whilst kicking a ball around the flat. Maybe it'll annoy a few people. I quite like the idea of annoying a few people once in a while.